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Summary: Through the judgments Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 
Sverige, the CJEU emphasised the power of the CFR (in particular arts 
7, 8, 52) through the fundamental right of data protection and general 
principles of law such as the principle of proportionality and legal cer-
tainty. Article 52 CFR represents the essence of justification. In the 
spirit of article 52(3) and (4) CFR it becomes evident that the CJEU, 
the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court go in the same direc-
tion. The CJEU was brave enough to deliver a scathing verdict on data 
retention. More strongly than the German CC, the CJEU safeguards 
data protection. Hence, the decisions of the CJEU were described as 
milestone decisions and the CJEU as a Court of fundamental rights. 
On the other hand, the CJEU focused all its power on proportionality 
expressed through the element of strict necessity. It is astonishing 
that the Court does not use the existing methodology on proportional-
ity to strengthen legal discipline and confidence. Although proportion-
ality may be assessed differently in single legal systems and cultures, 
the broad constitutionalisation and application of proportionality in 
jurisdiction proves the power of this general principle of law. The ex-
ploration of this principle is rather challenging, but most beneficial for 
the future application of primary law. 
1 Introduction 
Digitalisation penetrates fundamental, private and intimate areas 
of life, science, the economy, society and privacy. Drones, robots or au-
tomated driving are prominent symbols of product digitalisation. Closely 
linked to digitalisation is the use of algorithms and data processing. Peo-
ple like Edward Snowden have shaken the public and raised new aware-
ness of data.1 Hacker attacks and fake news have unsettled many people. 
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1 Matthias Bäcker, ‘Das Vorratsdatenurteil des EuGH: Ein Meilenstein des europäischen 
Grundrechtsschutzes’ (2014) 36 JA 1263, 1269.
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Artificial intelligence is not a physical object we can hold in our hands. 
Perhaps objects or subjects of artificial, autonomous intelligence are or 
will be smarter than people and are already or will soon become domi-
nant. Additionally, there is asymmetry of the parties involved, in particu-
lar among individuals, experts, big players and state authorities. These 
are the reasons why data protection, with a few remarkable judgments on 
data retention, is the subject of this paper. 
The legislation on data rights of the last few decades may give the 
impression that state powers act without a clue or that they can hardly 
keep up with the developments. Data protection is one of the legal gov-
ernance instruments the legislator has to regulate and operate. The over-
riding role of security concerns as put forward by the legislator is one of 
the key drivers to be assessed and in doing so the legislator touches on 
the balance of freedom and security.2 The legislation on data retention 
was a specific expression of the wish for preventive security in a trans-
forming world.3 Thus, Directive 2006/24 (the Data Retention Directive) 
on data retention came into focus.4 This directive demands data service 
providers to retain data preventively, generally and in a widespread man-
ner. This means that data may be collected without any reasons given. 
A dozen questions are raised thereby. The CJEU summarises the main 
reasons of disproportionality under the umbrella of strict necessity which 
leads to the condensed question of the justification of interference in the 
fundamental right of data protection in the light of proportionality as an-
chored in article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR): is the 
restriction of the right to personal data brought about by widespread data 
retention proportionate to the objective of preventive security pursued by 
the state? Therefore, we have to understand why and how the CJEU fo-
cuses on strict necessity in order to clarify conformity to the principle of 
proportionality. The judgments on data retention are of ground-breaking 
significance, touching on general principles of primary law. 
Remarkably, the CJEU in its decision in Digital Rights Ireland in 
2014 declared the Data Retention Directive as invalid, confirming this 
understanding in 2016 in its case Tele2 Sverige. In these judgements, 
the CJEU further developed the concept of strict necessity as an integral 
2 Markus Kotzur, ̒Wider den bloßen Verdacht – zur grundrechtssichernden Verantwor-
tung des EuGH im Spannungsfeld von Freiheit und Sicherheit ̓(2014) 41 EuGRZ 589; Jür-
gen Kühling, ‘Der Fall der Vorratsdatenspeicherungsrichlinie und der Aufstieg des EuGH 
zum Grundrechtsgericht’ (2014) 33 NVwZ 681, 685.
3 Spiros Simitis, ‘Die Vorratsdatenspeicherng – ein unverändert zweifelhaftes Privileg‘ 
(2014) 67 NJW 2158, 2159.
4 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ 105/54. 
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part of the proportionality test on data protection.5 The term ‘strict neces-
sity’ was used by the ECtHR as far back as 1978, in its Klass decision, 
where the ECtHR stated that ‘Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, 
characterizing as they did the police state, were tolerable under the Con-
vention only insofar as strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic in-
stitutions’.6 The CJEU first used this test in Satamedia 2008, before the 
CFR entered into force, stating ‘the protection of the fundamental right 
to privacy requires that the derogations and limitations in relation to the 
protection of data (..) must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary’.7 
The CJEU has used the strict necessity test in relation to the right to 
data protection in a consistent manner ever since. Even before Digital 
Rights Ireland in 2014, the CJEU considered the ‘strict necessity’ test to 
be settled case law.8 The ECtHR in the meantime forgot about its own in-
vention9 and remembered it only after it was used by the CJEU in Digital 
Rights Ireland. It did so by direct reference to this judgment.10 
However, in the previous cases the CJEU did not demonstrate what 
‘strict’ and ‘necessary’ were in the established proportionality test for 
data protection. It did so after the Satamedia case, wondering about 
what ‘strict’ for this purpose meant and if it was even a valid criteri-
on.11 The colliding interests had also been different in previous cases, as 
data protection was balanced against the fundamental right to freedom 
of expression,12 transparency of the use of funds,13 and the right of the 
subject to be informed about the processing of his personal data for the 
purpose of a private detective’s investigation.14
The initial question raised here is if the strict necessity test copes 
with the goals of security with the fundamental right of data protection 
5 cf the concept of strict necessity already commented on by Andreas Wehlau and Niels 
Lutzhöft, ‘Grundrechte-Charta und Grundrechts-Checkliste – eine dogmatische Selbstverp-
flichtung der EU-Organe’ (2012) 23 EuZW 45, 48.
6 Klass and others v Federal Republic of Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214, para 42.
7 Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy 
(Satakunnan) ECLI:EU:C:2008:727 para 56.
8 Case C-473/12 Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) v Geoffrey Englebert 
and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:715,  para 39.
9 The ECtHR did not use or mention the strict necessity test in its fundamental decisions 
on data protection: Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433; S and Marper v the United King-
dom (2009) 48 EHRR 50; Nada v Switzerland, (2013) 56 EHRR 18.
10 Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016) paras 23 and 73.
11 Wouter Hins,  ̒Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy 
and Satamedia Oy, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 16 December 2008, not yet reported 
̓ (2010) 47(1) CMLR 215, 216, 233.
12 Satakunnan (n 7) paras 53f.
13 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and others v Land 
Hessen ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 77 and 86.
14 Case C-473/12 Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) v Geoffrey Englebert 
and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:715, para 26.
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on the grounds of the principle of proportionality as stipulated in article 
52(1) CFR. An analysis of the concept of strict necessity of the CJEU with 
regard to data retention in comparison with other jurisdictions should 
reveal the novelties in the application of the proportionality test: is it a 
necessity test, what are the overall assessment criteria used in this test, 
and how does the element of the strict necessity test correlate with the 
methodology of proportionality as a whole? A comparison with the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court (CC), in 
particular its decision on data retention in 2010, are of great help in this 
regard. Namely, a couple of years before Digital Rights Ireland in 2010, 
the German CC declared as invalid the national legislation on data re-
tention based on the EU Data Retention Directive. Between these judg-
ments, several convergences as well as divergences stand out. German 
jurisdiction on data protection has existed since 1983 and its methodol-
ogy on justification and proportionality may be valuable for further com-
parison.15 Additionally, the case law of the ECtHR on fundamental rights, 
proportionality and fair balance may be of significance. 
2 Data protection legislation as a reaction of state authorities to 
innovation and security 
2.1 Legislation strongly driven by security concerns 
The following graph shows the legislative beginning of data protec-
tion within single Member States of the EU, followed by international de-
velopments in positive law.16 From 1995 we can see the legislative activ-
ism of the EU which caused the judgments of the CJEU in 2014 and 2016 
on the Data Retention Directive and the judgment of the German CC in 
2010 due to the German legislator who had immediately implemented the 
Data Retention Directive in national laws through the so-called Law on 
the Revision of Telecommunication Monitoring in 2007.17 
Remarkably, we can identify two waves of legislation. One wave oc-
curred in the 1970s and one at the beginning of this century. The first 
wave was driven by innovation due to missing positive law on data pro-
tection as an answer to the rise of information technology. Firstly, we can 
15 Spiros Simitis,  ̒Einleitung ̓ in Spiros Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th edn, 
Nomos 2014) 92.
16 Extended, initial version of the graph, Jürgen Kühling, Christian Seidel and Anastasios 
Sivridis, Datenschutzrecht (CF Müller 2015) 62. 
17 This is an omnibus law which means that different laws had to be revised. The main 
changes were made in the Telecommunications Act. This law serves preventive data reten-
tion. The repressive approaches to data monitoring for criminal prosecutions led to a revi-
sion of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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notice such legislation in Hesse, one of Germany’s 16 federal states.18 
Sweden, and Germany as an entire state, followed.19 International and 
EU legislation shows there has been a global demand for regulation. Logi-
cally, the legislation approaches differ. The spectrum ranged from ab-
stract framework legislation up to sectoral governance, as well as com-
binations of these approaches. This is interesting due to the analogous 
discussion nowadays on how to approach data protection.20 
After these first codifications, the EU in 1995 started to establish 
positive law on data protection to give different national regulations a 
common framework.21 This second wave of European legislation was cer-
tainly driven both by technological progress and economic interests. But 
it seems that the legislators were very much driven by security concerns.22 
The first step was taken with the adoption of the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001.23 The Cybercrime 
Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the 
internet and other computer networks.24 Since 9/11, terrorist concerns 
18 Kai von Lewinski, ̒Einleitung‘ in Martin Eßer, Philipp Kramer and Kai von Lewinski (eds), 
BDSG (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2015) 93, para 22; Simitis  ̒(n 15) 82.
19 Simitis  ̒(n 15) 134.
20 Martin Eßer, Philipp Kramer and Kai von Lewinski, DSGVO-BDSG (5th edn, Carl Heyman-
ns Verlag 2017); Jürgen Kühling, Datenschutz Grundverordnung (CH Beck 2017); Gernot 
Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung (Nomos 2017).
21 Simitis (n 15) 166.
22 Kotzur (n 2) 589; Antonie Moser-Knierim, Vorratsdatenspeicherung – zwischen Überwa-
chungsstaat und Terrorabwehr (Springer 2014).
23 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 8 November 2001.
24 Convention on Cybercrime (European Treaty Series no 185 <www.coe.int/en/web/con-
ventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185> accessed 29 May 2017.
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have determined legislators’ behaviour significantly.25 The terror attacks 
in London in 2005, and before that in Madrid 2004, evoked rapid reactions 
from the EU.26 In a rather fast legislation process, the EU implemented the 
Data Retention Directive. Perhaps these rapid reactions were the reason 
for the dubious quality of this directive. This background knowledge is of 
importance when the CJEU assesses the validity of the directive. The his-
torical circumstances may explain the need for such a regulation and may 
also indicate the disproportionate content of the directive. 
2.2 CJEU on data retention 2014 and 2016 – Invalidity of the 
directive on data retention
In focus here is the application of the strict necessity test by the 
CJEU in its cases Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige. In Digital 
Rights Ireland in 2014, the whole of the Data Retention Directive was 
under question. After the CJEU declared this directive invalid in its case 
Tele2 Sverige, the Court in 2016 had to decide, on the legal basis of arti-
cle 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, if and to what extent national legislation 
on data retention was in conformity with European law. At this point, we 
shall briefly recall why the directive on data retention was questioned, 
thus leading to the preliminary ruling before the CJEU. The same will be 
shown briefly with regards to the development of the latest jurisprudence 
of the German CC on data retention and protection. Focus will be placed 
on essential points taken into account in the proportionality test by the 
courts. A concrete analysis of the single steps of the proportionality test 
follows a short overview of the respective case law. 
2.2.1 Digital Rights Ireland 2014 
In the case Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU had to examine the valid-
ity of the Data Retention Directive on data retention. The CJEU declared 
the directive invalid due to non-conformity with the fundamental right of 
data protection (arts 7 and 8 CFR) and the principle of proportionality (art 
52(1) CFR). The directive was adopted subsequent to different terror at-
tacks to unify the various rules on data protection in the Member States. 
In 2012 the High Court of Ireland and the Verfassungsgerichtshof of Aus-
tria requested a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 267 TFEU on the 
validity of the directive above. Different claimants from Ireland and Aus-
tria protested against the directive, claiming that the fundamental rights 
of data protection, freedom of speech (arts 7, 8, 11 CFR) were violated, as 
were the economic interests of the telecommunication service providers 
who were obliged to retain data. Such providers were instructed to retain 
25 Florian Becker,  ̒Grundrechtliche Grenzen staatlicher Überwachung zur Gefahren-
abwehr ̓ (2015) 34 NVwZ 1335; Kühling (n 2). 
26 Alexander Roßnagel,  ̒Die neue Vorratsdatenspeicherung ̓ (2016) 69 NJW 533.
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all communication data (eg location, duration, participants, metadata) of 
all subjects for a retention period of six to twenty-four months. Concrete 
suspicion or facts justifying retention were not required. The goal was to 
ensure security through the fight against, for example, international ter-
rorism or serious crime. State authorities were allowed to use such data. 
2.2.2 Reasons for a second judgment on data retention after 2014: Tele2 
Sverige 2016 
The Tele2 Sverige case arose after many question in Digital Rights Ire-
land remained unanswered.27 It was unclear to what extent the invalidity 
of the directive affected national legislation on data retention. Many na-
tional legislators remained convinced that their national legislation was 
in line with articles 7 and 8 GRC, despite the Digital Rights Ireland ruling. 
It was unclear if widespread data retention of all subjects and all means 
of communication was allowed at all. It was also quite unclear which 
elements caused the invalidity of the directive, whether all the aspects 
all together violated the principle of proportionality or whether each sin-
gle element caused disproportionality.28 The High Administrative Court 
in Stockholm and the Appeal Court of England and Wales requested a 
preliminary ruling because the national laws on data retention served to 
implement the Data Retention Directive which had become obsolete after 
the judgment in Digital Rights Ireland. Instead, Directive 2002/58 served 
from then on as the legal basis for data protection at the EU level. The 
CJEU was requested to answer whether EU law was applicable and if the 
national laws conformed to the fundamental right of data protection. The 
Court declared that article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 had to be interpret-
ed in the light of articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) CFR.29 Hence, the widespread 
retention of traffic and location data at the national level of all people and 
all means of communication was not allowed. This means that not only 
was the Data Retention Directive invalid, but the same processing at the 
national level was also not allowed. 
2.3 German CC on the invalidity of laws on data retention 2010
Germany was rather fast in implementing the Data Retention Direc-
tive. This is astonishing when compared to other directives where Ger-
many exhausted the implementation period right up to the end, exceeded 
the time limits, or tried to avoid parts of the implementation. The German 
legislator may be driven by strong security interests, but this is no excuse. 
In 2007 the legislator implemented the Data Retention Directive through 
27 Bäcker (n 1) 1265; Spiros Simitis, Die Vorratsdatenspeicherng – ein unverändert zweif-
elhaftes Privileg (2014) 67 NJW 2158; Kühling (n 2) 683.
28 Kühling (n 2) 683; Bäcker (n 1) 1269.
29 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para 92. 
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establishing new rules within different laws such as the Code of Criminal 
Procedure or the Telecommunication Monitoring Regulation.30 This shows 
that data retention from the preventive point has a police law dimension 
and from the repressive point of view a criminal law dimension. In 2010 
the German CC declared the laws unconstitutional.31 In doing so, it was 
yet again participating in European constitutional discourse,32 this time on 
data protection.
3 The essence of the right to data protection 
To examine the essence of fundamental rights is rather demand-
ing.33 First of all there is no common understanding of the content and 
limits of the essence of a right. It is even unclear if interference with the 
essence of a right is justifiable. This is comparable to a discussion on 
human dignity in terms of whether interference with a so-called untouch-
able right is justifiable. Methodologically, different opinions exist about 
the kind of examination of essence. Partially, it is seen as the final evo-
lution of proportionality. However, the CJEU seems, in accordance with 
the wording and systematic structure of article 52(1) CFR, to prefer the 
opinion that essence is an independent element of justification to be ex-
amined chronologically before proportionality. 
With regard to doctrinal discussions on the essence of rights, it is 
astonishing that the CJEU in the case of data retention states that the 
essence of data protection is untouched, because the Directive does not 
permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the electronic com-
munications as such.34 It may not be concluded that the CJEU tried to 
avoid deeper elaboration of this difficult issue. Namely, only one year later 
in the fundamental Schrems judgment, the CJEU consistently applied the 
very same criteria for the essence of the right to private life with regards 
to data retention and came to the opposite conclusion.35 The CJEU stated 
importantly ‘that permitting the public authorities to have access on a 
generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be 
30 Strafprozessordnung oder Telekommunikations-Überwachunsgverordnung, BGBl I 2007, 
3198. 
31 BVerfG - 1 BvR 256/08 of 2 March 2010, para 260.
32 Tamara Ćapeta, ̒Courts, Legal Culture and EU Enlargement ̓ (2005) 1 CYELP 1, 6.
33 Elisabeth Rumler-Korinek and Erich Vranes in Michael Holoubek and Georg Lienbacher 
(eds), GRCh-Kommentar (Manz 2014) art 52 - ‘Tragweite und Auslegung der Rechte und 
Grundsätze’ 755, para 18; Andreas Wehlau and Niels Lutzhöft,  ̒Grundrechte-Charta und 
Grundrechts-Checkliste – eine dogmatische Selbstverpflichtung der EU-Organe ̓ (2012) 23 
EuZW 45, 49; Nils Schaks, ̒Die Wesensgehaltsgarantie, art 19 II GG ̓ (2015) 55 JuS 407.
34 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, para 
39.
35 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, 
para 94. 
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regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to re-
spect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter’. It seems 
that the CJEU developed the standard further, as not only did it take 
into consideration whether it was permitted for public authorities to ac-
quire knowledge about the content of electronic communication, but also 
whether this was permitted ‘on a generalised basis’.36 Whether mere ‘re-
tention of the content of a communication’ is sufficient, as again exam-
ined and denied one year later in Tele2 Sverige,37 or whether in addition 
the permission needs to be a general one, will be seen in future cases. 
The criteria of general permission would have been fulfilled in Digital 
Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige anyway. The more important question 
here is if the CJEU takes a too formalistic approach by requiring direct 
access to the content of communication. The Court itself finds that the 
retention of other communication data may allow very precise conclu-
sions on the private life of the people concerned, such as the habits of 
everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other 
movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those 
persons and the social environments frequented by them.38 These are all 
content data, only gathered indirectly. It can be seen as the outcome of 
the principle of giving priority to direct over indirect as well as over hid-
den data collection.39 Another question is whether the essence test is the 
right one to reach this goal. 
Here the German CC goes further. The court claims that data reten-
tion allows content conclusions.40 However, the German CC did not find 
that this was enough to interfere with the essence of the right to private 
life. Within the scope of application of the CFR, the German CC will need 
to change its mind. By following the reasoning of the CJEU, the question 
arises of the consequence when the essence of data protection is touched 
on by the content of the communication data. Here we have to take into 
consideration that in the Schrems judgment the CJEU did not examine 
the proportionality test, because the essence of the right to private life 
was already found to have been compromised.41 This is in line with the 
36 Johannes Eichenhofer  ̒“e-Privacy“ im europäischen Grundrechtsschutz: Das “Schrems-
Urteil” des EuGH ̓ (2016) 51 EuR 76, 84.
37 Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 101.
38 ibid, para 99; Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 27.
39 Thorsten Kingreen in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (5th edn, 
Beck 2016) art 8 GRCh - ̒Schutz personenbezogener Daten‘ 2809, para 16: ̒Vorrang der 
unmittelbaren vor der mittelbaren Datenerhebung als auch Vorrang der offenen vor der 
verdeckten Datenerhebung ̓.
40 BVerfG (n 31) para 211; Andreas Nachbaur,  ̒Vorratsdatenspeicherung “light” – Re-
chtswidrig und allenfalls bedingt von Nutzen ̓ (2015) 48 ZRP 215, 217.
41 Thomas Giegerich,  ̒Europäische Vorreiterrolle im Datenschutzrecht – Neue Entwicklun-
gen in der Gesetzgebung, Rechtsprechung und internationalen Praxis der EU ̓ (2016) 19 
ZeuS 301, 334.
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‘absolute theory’ on the essence of a fundamental right that considers in-
terference with the essence as unjustifiable.42 This is also in line with the 
fact that the essence test is now a separate criterion within article 52(1) 
CFR.43 However, in line with the concept of the right to personal data as a 
right to self-determination, even in cases where the essence of the right is 
interfered with, a person should be given the opportunity to give consent 
to the interference and thereby make it valid.44
4 The proportionality test pursuant to article 52(1) CFR with regards 
to the fundamental right to data protection  
The following analysis is based on the recognised logic of proportion-
ality, fully aware that different opinions on the logic of proportionality 
exist.45 Nevertheless, the four steps of the legitimate objective, appro-
priateness, necessity and reasonableness (proportionality in the narrow 
sense) may be identified as an essential skeleton in the judgments of the 
CJEU.46 If the legitimate objective is deemed an autonomous element 
to be examined separately before proportionality, the structure of pro-
portionality consists of three elements.47 The methodology or, as other 
authors emphasise, rationality in balancing is key.48 This is irrespective 
of the next question of how subjective or how objective proportionality or 
balancing can be.49 Although the CJEU does not consistently examine 
the principle of proportionality, the Court basically supports the logic of a 
three-step proportionality test.50 The most common formula used by the 
Court is that 
42 Eichenhofer  ̒(n 36) 85.
43 Thorsten Kingreen in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (5th edn, 
Beck 2016)  art 52 GRCh, ̒Tragweite und Auslegung der Rechte und Grundsätze ̓  2982, 
para 64.
44 Jürgen Kühling and Johanna Heberlein,  ̒EuGH “Reloaded”: “Unsafe Harbor” USA vs 
“Datenfestung” EU ̓ (2016) 35 NVwZ 7, 10.
45 Margit Bühler, Einschränkung von Grundrechten nach der Europäischen Grundrech-
techarta (Duncker & Humblot 2005) 104.
46 Case C-365/08 Agrana Zucker GmbH v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, 
Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft ECLI:EU:C:2010:27, Opinion of GA Trstenjak, para 60; Case 
C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2010:560, Opinion 
of GA Trstenjak, para 62; Kingreen (43) art 52 GRCh, 2983, para 65; Clemens Ladenburger 
and Hannes Krämer in Klaus Stern and Michael Sachs (eds), EUV/AEUV (Beck 2016) art 52 
GRCh -  ̒Tragweite und Auslegung der Rechte und Grundsätze ̓ 798, para 48ff.
47 Rumler-Korinek and Vranes (n 33) art 52 GRCh 755, para 16; Nicolas Raschauer and 
Thomas Riesz in Michael Holoubek and Georg Lienbacher (eds), GRCh-Kommentar (Mnz 
2014) art 8 GRCh -  ̒Schutz personenbezogener Daten ̓  119, para 33; Matthias Klatt and 
Moritz Meister,  ̒Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit ̓ (2014) 54 JuS, 193, 196.
48 For instance, Klatt and Meister (n 47) 195. 
49 Concretely on the understanding of objectivity, see Klatt and Meister (n 47) 198.  
50 Wolfgang Weiß,  ̒Grundrechtsschutz durch den EuGH: Tendenzen seit Lissabon ̓ (2013) 
24 EuZW 287, 290; Kingreen (43) art 52 GRCh, 2982, para 65.
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measures adopted do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate 
and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued 
by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, 
and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued.51 
Here we can find the previously identified four elements: the legiti-
mate objective, the appropriate measure, ’the least onerous measure’ cri-
terion that can be attributed to the necessity test, and the ‘not dispropor-
tionate to the aims pursued’ criterion as reasonableness/proportionality 
in the narrow sense.52 The Court itself refers to proportionality in Digital 
Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige as settled case law.53 
Admittedly, the CFR does not provide good support for the differ-
entiation between the necessity and reasonableness requirement. But 
reasonableness is not directly referred to and may be derived from the 
repeated mentioning of proportionality, and therefore interpreted as pro-
portionality in the narrow sense.54 From other jurisdictions and legal lit-
erature, it becomes clear that proportionality in the narrow sense is the 
final step of proportionality, whether as a separate step or included in 
one of the other elements of proportionality.55 But data protection served 
as an essential motor for the justification test after the CFR entered into 
force through the Lisbon treaty.56 Proportionality in the case law of the 
CJEU is very much characterised by the balancing of the interests and 
rights concerned.57 With regard to data protection, derogations can only 
apply when strictly necessary.58 Hence, there is a new, combinatory pow-
er through the correlation of the CFR, fundamental rights, data protec-
tion and the principle of proportionality driven through strict necessity, 
as well as based on the already existing doctrine on proportionality. 
51 Joined Cases C-96/03 and C-97/03 Tempelman and van Schaijk v Directeur van de Ri-
jksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees ECLI:EU:C:2005:145, para 47.
52 Hans D Jarass, GRCh (3rd edn, CH Beck 2016) art 52 - ̒Tragweite und Auslegung der 
Rechte und Grundsätze ̓ 501, para 36.
53 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 45f; Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 96.
54 Kingreen (n 43) art 52 GRCh, 2984, para 70; Rumler-Korinek and Vranes (n 47) art 52 
GRCh 755, para 16.
55 Johannes Saurer,  ̒Die Globalisierung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes ̓ (2012) 51 
Der Staat 3, 9; Florian Becker,  ̒Grundrechtliche Grenzen staatlicher Überwachung zur 
Gefahrenabwehr ̓ (2015) 34 NVwZ 2015 1335, 1336.
56 Steve Peers and Sacha Prechal, ‘Article 52 – Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Prin-
ciples’ in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Nomos, CH Beck, Hart Publishing 2014) art 52 CFR, 1482, para 
52.70.
57 Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financi-
eros de Crédito and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo v Administración 
del Estado ECLI:EU:C:2011:777 paras 43, 47f; Volker und Schecke (n 13) para 77, 86.
58 Volker und Schecke (n 13) paras 77, 86; Kingreen (n 39) art 8 GRCh, 2809, para 16.
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To stay focused, proportionality here is analysed on the grounds of 
the two decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige, both deci-
sions made on the issue of data retention. In both decisions, laws on 
data retention were deemed not to conform to the fundamental right of 
data protection (art 8 CFR) and proportionality as a general principle of 
law now codified in article 52(1) CFR. This provision serves as the cor-
nerstone of justification in the field of fundamental rights. Other gen-
eral principles of law, such as legal certainty or confidence, serve as fur-
ther standards of verification. As the CJEU did in its decisions later, the 
ECtHR emphasised the need for clear, precise laws on data retention. 
Thereby, the ECtHR strengthens the principle of proportionality through 
the principle of legal certainty. The ECtHR increases the requirements of 
proportionality in the field of data protection.59 In accordance with arti-
cle 8(2) ECHR, the ECtHR demands strict necessity for justification. For 
sure, the case law of the ECtHR served as support, as clearly shown by 
the CJEU in referencing essential cases of the ECtHR.60 Thus, the Court 
declared the Data Retention Directive invalid. As far as the decision in 
Tele2 Sverige deviates from Digital Rights Ireland or emphasises specific 
elements, these selected elements will be explained as such. 
4.1 Legitimate objective test
The CJEU admits that the fight against international terrorism in or-
der to maintain international peace and security constitutes an objective 
of general interest and argues that the same is true of the fight against 
serious crime in order to ensure public security.61 But the Court criticises 
that it remains unclear what in specific terms a serious crime is.62 Under 
strict necessity, the CJEU describes the insufficient regulation of serious 
crime. The CJEU demands that the ‘use of the data in question must be 
strictly restricted to the purpose of preventing and detecting precisely 
defined serious offences or of conducting criminal prosecutions relating 
thereto’.63 The Court states further that such 
data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has 
been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or tem-
porary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities 
carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social 
environments frequented by them.64 
59 Leander v Sweden (n 9) para 60ff. 
60 For instance expressly Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) paras 35, 47, 54; Bäcker (n 1) 1273.
61 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 42.
62 ibid, para 60.
63 ibid, para 61.
64 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 27.
145CYELP 13 [2017] 133-168
For its part, the German CC emphasises the principle of legal cer-
tainty supporting the requirements of proportionality. Access is not re-
stricted to the objective of serious crimes and is not subject to a court 
decision requirement.65 Crimes which may be able to justify the extent 
and weight of interference need to be clearly and precisely determined.66 
Although the law should have served the legitimate objective of fighting 
terrorism, this goal may not be generally used as a justification.67 In the 
light of proportionality in the narrow sense – which may be translated 
as an element of strict necessity in the language of the CJEU – it is not 
enough to justify restrictions of fundamental rights by an abstract legiti-
mate objective. State authorities need concrete facts of suspicion.68 The 
prognosis of danger has to reach a certain degree of likelihood, but occa-
sional behaviour or simple assumptions may not serve as justification.69 
The CJEU here goes in the same direction, but more abstractly: 
Directive 2006/24 affects, in a comprehensive manner, all persons 
using electronic communications services, but without the persons 
whose data are retained being, even indirectly, in a situation which 
is liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions. It therefore applies 
even to persons for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting 
that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, 
with serious crime.
If this is true, the legitimate objective is already a hurdle in fulfilling 
the requirements of the proportionality test. Thus, the CJEU could have 
clarified the invalidity of the directive even at this stage.70 Such a clear 
structure does not prevent the detection of further elements of dispropor-
tionality.71 However, the Court examines all these thoughts under the um-
brella of strict necessity mixed together with other facts, aspects, elements 
and explanations. Access to and the subsequent use of the data in ques-
tion must be strictly restricted to the purpose of preventing and detecting 
precisely defined serious offences or of conducting criminal prosecutions 
relating thereto.72 For the Court, the element of legitimate objective seems 
not to be the right place for deeper examination of such an objective. This 
simple affirmation is questionable because chronologically and logically 
65 BVerfG (n 31) para 247ff. 
66 ibid, para 228.
67 ibid, para 250ff.
68 ibid, paras 228, 261, 289: the German CC speaks of concrete facts constituting suspi-
cion or sufficient initial suspicion.
69 Florian Becker, ̒Grundrechtliche Grenzen staatlicher Überwachung zur Gefahrenabwehr 
̓ (2015) 34 NVwZ 2015 1335, 1336.
70 Also in Lorin-Johannes Wagner, Der Datenschutz in der Europäischen Union (Jan Sramek 
Verlag 2015) 86.
71 Peers and Prechal (n 56) art 52 CFR, 1482, para 52.71.
72 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 61.
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the element of legitimate objective is prior to (strict) necessity, as an own 
element.73 
From the perspective of the outcome of the ruling, it is remarkable 
and only consistent that strict necessity already refers to the legitimate 
objective considering the relevant arguments under this umbrella. The 
content of strict necessity proves that it is not just a necessity test. This 
conclusion is hidden in the extensive balancing within the reasonable-
ness test.
4.2 Appropriateness test 
The CJEU examines appropriateness in Digital Rights Ireland by 
stating that data which must be retained pursuant to the Data Retention 
Directive allow the national authorities which are competent for criminal 
prosecutions to have additional opportunities to shed light on serious 
crime and, in this respect, the data are a valuable tool for criminal inves-
tigations.74 It is common legal understanding that the appropriateness 
test is not very strict, as it is enough that a measure aims to support the 
legitimate objective.75 With regards to market freedoms, the CJEU usual-
ly requires only that it is not ‘manifestly inappropriate’.76 In order to prove 
this standard, even a rather vague argumentation is sufficient. The Court 
could have at least questioned the supportive power of data retention. 
For instance, data retention may be misleading or misused. Subjects 
could use false IPs, names, other Wi-Fi access or hotspots anonymous-
ly.77 However, in Tele2 Sverige the CJEU did not examine this step or 
repeat the rather simple examination of Digital Rights Ireland. Even if in 
result this may be correct, it is an integral part of the proportionality test. 
It ensures the logic of examination, self-reflection and legal discipline. 
All together, normative structures have to correspond to an asystematic, 
coherent approach, and to follow clear objectives avoiding contradictions, 
in particular in the area of equality.78
4.3 Necessity test
There is no universal doctrine on necessity. This is understandable 
given the different legal systems and cultures. Different views and 
73 Margit Bühler, Einschränkung von Grundrechten nach der Europäischen Grundrech-
techarta (Duncker & Humblot 2005) 104.; Kingreen (n 43) art 52 GRCh, 2985, para 71; 
Jarass (n 52) art 52 GRCh 501, para 36, 503, para 41.
74 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 49.
75 Rumler-Korinek and Vranes (n 33) art 52 GRCh, para 16; Raschauer and Riesz (n 47) art 
8 GRCh, 119, para 33; Jarass (n 52) art 52 GRCh 502, para 37f.
76 Eg Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para 123.
77 BVerfG (n 31) para 207. 
78 Kingreen (n 43) art 52 GRCh, 2984, para 68.
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intensity of examination may lead to varying or finally different results. 
But necessity is broadly recognised as an integral part of proportionality 
and has to be examined as the step subsequent to appropriateness 
and before proportionality in the narrow sense.79 This cannot explain 
the inconsistencies in the examination of necessity. It is difficult to 
distinguish necessity from proportionality in the narrow sense if balancing 
or normative assessment is done within the frame of necessity.80 It may 
function as a rather neutral, scientific filter before appropriateness. 
Hence, necessity is deemed as an essentially fact-oriented examination 
if a milder means could have been used to achieve the same success.81 
This view provoked the thesis that necessity may doctrinally be the most 
secure part of proportionality.82 According to the CJEU ‘as far as when 
there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must 
be had to the least onerous’.83 The necessity test requires the search for 
alternative means.84 An alternative in the area of data retention may be 
the so-called ‘quick freeze’ of data. According to ‘quick freeze’, operators 
are obliged to retain data relating only to specific individuals suspected 
of criminal activity as from the date of the preservation order issued by a 
court85 or another competent authority. This means that data are retained 
in single cases, not in a widespread manner from all people and means 
of communication, and are immediately frozen in the case of concrete 
suspicion. This could be a milder procedure because it is not necessary 
to retain data for weeks, months or years without any reason. 
It is remarkable that the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 
Sverige skipped the necessity test completely. Perhaps the Court deemed 
the test too easy or unimportant, although the Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón referred to the necessity test, specifically to the alternative of 
quick freeze.86 It cannot be disregarded that ‘quick freeze’ is the option 
79 Rumler-Korinek and Vranes (n 33) art 52 GRCh, 755, para 16; Raschauer and Riesz (n 
47) art 8 GRCh, 119, para 33; Ladenburger and Krämer (n 46) Art 52 GRCh, 789, para 49; 
Hans D Jarass, GRCh (3rd edn, CH Beck 2016) art 8 - ̒Schutz personenbezogener Daten ̓ 
GRCh 106, para 14. 
80 Benjamin Rustenberg, Der grundrechtliche Gewährleistungsgehalt (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 
223; Kingreen (n 43) Art 52 GRCh, 2984, para 69ff.
81 Philipp Reimer,  ̒… und machet zu Jüngern alle Völker’?; Von ‘universellen Verfassung-
sprinzipien‘ und der Weltmacht der Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte ̓ (2013) 52 Der Staat 
27, 33.
82 Christoph Möllers,  ̒Wandel der Grundrechtsjudikatur, Eine Analyse der Rechtspre-
chung des Ersten Senats des BVerfG ̓ 59 (2005) NJW 1973, 1975.
83 Joined Cases C-37/06 and C-58/06 Viamex Agrar Handels and Zuchtvieh-Kontor v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas ECLI:EU:C:2008:18, para 35. 
84 Ladenburger and Krämer (n 46) Art 52 GRCh, 789, para 49; Jarass (n 79) art 8 GRCh 
106, para 14.
85 Commission, ‘Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC)’ 
COM (2011) 225 final 5.
86 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, para 142.
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chosen by article 16 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime adopted 
by the Council of Europe 2001 which is in force in the EU Member States. 
This is also referred to not only by the Advocate General, but also by the 
Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive issued by the Com-
mission in 2011.87 The report also elaborates on the method of ‘quick 
freeze plus’. This model goes beyond data preservation in that a com-
petent authority may also grant access to data which have not yet been 
deleted by the operators.88 In most cases this will at least be the data 
already stored for one month for the purpose of justifying the bill issued 
by the telecommunication operators. The same alternative means was 
discussed by the German CC in its decision on data retention.89 However, 
if there is any explanation possible for the CJEU skipping the necessity 
test, all of the previously mentioned came to the conclusion that ‘quick 
freeze’ cannot effectively replace data retention. The AG did so by simply 
stating that ‘the idea that the data in question must remain accumulated 
for a period of time is one of the key aspects of a measure intended to 
make the public authorities better able to respond to certain forms of 
serious crime’.90 The German CC did not do much more or much better, 
simply arguing that ‘such a procedure that encompasses data from the 
date before the preservation order issued by the authority only insofar 
as they are still available, is not as effective as a continuous storage that 
ensures a complete availability of data from the past six months’.91 Or, in 
other words, the purpose of data retention cannot be achieved if there are 
no data retained. Both miss the point that the legitimate objective is the 
fight against specific serious crimes, and data retention is not the pur-
pose in itself. A study by the German Max Planck Institute on the number 
on criminal cases where data have been requested by German authorities 
before the obligation of data retention was introduced by law shows that, 
for example, only in 0.01% of annual criminal investigations in Germany 
in 200592 were the requested data already deleted.93 This may lead to 
the conclusion that in 99% of cases quick freeze was even an effective 
measure.94 Of course, on the other hand, it needs to be taken into consid-
87 Commission (n 85) 5.
88 ibid.
89 BVerfG (n 31) para 208.
90 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 86) para 142.
91 BVerfG (n 31) para 208.
92 Christian DeSimone, ̒Pitting Karlsruhe Against Luxembourg? – German Data Protection 
and the Contested Implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive ̓ (2010) 11 German 
Law Journal, 291, 311.
93 Overall analysis of legal practice Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Adina Grafe and Michael Kich-
ling, Rechtswirklichkeit der Auskunftserteilung über Telekommunikationsverbindungsdaten 
nach §§ 100g, 100h StPO: Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz 
(Duncker & Humblot 2008).  
94 DeSimone (n 92) 11.
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eration that the decision of the authorities to request data is influenced 
by the fact regarding whether or not the data are stored.95 Anyhow, the 
discussion seems to deserve a more thorough analysis from both courts.
What we can now say for sure is that in Digital Rights Ireland and 
Tele2 Sverige ‘strict necessity’ was not examined as a ‘stricter’ necessity 
test. On the contrary, the CJEU did not examine necessity at all. In its 
decision in Volker and Schecke the Court proved legal discipline by think-
ing about the alternative of a milder means in the spirit of necessity when 
stating that 
there is nothing to show that, when adopting (…), the Council and 
the Commission took into consideration methods of publishing in-
formation on the beneficiaries concerned which would be consistent 
with the objective of such publication while at the same time causing 
less interference with those beneficiaries’ right to respect for their 
private life in general and to protection of their personal data in 
particular…96 
Therefore, no conclusion should be drawn that the ‘strict necessity’ 
test excludes the regular necessity test. In the Volker and Schecke judg-
ment, the CJEU applied ‘strict necessity’ as a form of stricter necessity.97 
It did so by lowering the standard for the necessity test. The CJEU used 
the following argumentation: 
derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal 
data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (Satamedia, 
para 56) and that it is possible to envisage measures which affect 
less adversely that fundamental right of natural persons and which 
still contribute effectively to the objectives of the European Union 
rules in question
With regard to the legitimate objective, the effects of an alternative 
means do not have to reach the same or similar effect. The CJEU lowers 
the second part of the definition of necessity to ‘a still effective contri-
bution’. This opens a broader field for alternative necessity and makes 
it more difficult for the legislator to adopt the most effective measure. 
Hence, apart from the methodological inconsistencies, it is astonishing 
that the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige did not apply 
the necessity test to strengthen the strict necessity standard. 
95 Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Adina Grafe and Michael Kichling, Rechtswirklichkeit der Auskunft-
serteilung über Telekommunikationsverbindungsdaten nach §§ 100g, 100h StPO: Forschun-
gsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz (Duncker & Humblot 2008) 214.
96 Volker und Schecke (n 13) para 81.
97 ibid, paras 83 and 86.
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4.4 Test of proportionality in a narrow sense summarised by the 
CJEU under the umbrella of strict necessity  
The Court focuses all its power on strict necessity within the rea-
sonableness test, combining different elements under this umbrella.98 
Thereby, this element of proportionality receives strong reinforcement. 
But it remains unclear if every element of strict necessity leads to dis-
proportionality or only cumulatively (widespread retention of all data, of 
all means of communication, of all people, retention for a period up to 
twenty-four months, missing a precise, clear definition of serious crimes, 
lack of technical, organisational protection and security measures).99 
There is a difference of impact of consequences if every element itself is 
already not proportionate.100 It could be argued that, if only the power of 
all elements together cause disproportionality, the legislator may achieve 
conformity by the amendment of single elements.101 The breach may ap-
pear less harmful but depends on the metal effect of the elements. Be-
sides other questions, the fundamental tenor of the decision is of leading 
importance for future legislation on data retention as a whole. In both 
decisions, the CJEU stresses that ‘having regard to all of the foregoing’, 
the right to data protection is disproportionally interfered with. If we put 
enough weight on this rather usual phrase at the end of a legal assess-
ment of a single preliminary question, we would conclude that only all 
of the elements together constitute a breach.102 The Schrems judgement 
does not provide a clear answer either, as again the CJEU evaluated the 
elements together and concluded that they do not fulfil the requirements 
of strict necessity.103  
The following aspects of strict necessity are represented in a compar-
ison of the case law of the CJEU on data retention with the essentials of 
the case law of the German CC. It is remarkable that the judgments show 
the main convergences, but there are divergences in detail, intensity of 
requirements, impact on legislation and general principles of law. It is 
also remarkable that the ECtHR after so many years started to use the 
strict necessity test again. In its decision in Szabó and Vissy v Hungary 
of 2016, the ECtHR expressly refers to Digital Rights Ireland. In the area 
of data protection, the ECtHR demands that ‘“necessity in a democratic 
98 Kingreen (n 39) art 8 GRCh, 2809, para 16; Kingreen (n 43) art 52 GRCh, 2984, para 
69ff.
99 Reinhard Priebe,  ̒Reform der Vorratsdatenspeicherung – strenge Maßstäbe des EuGH ̓ 
(2014) 25 EuZW, 456, 457.
100 Kühling (n 2) 683f.
101  Bäcker (n 1) 1269.
102 Kühling considers the elements to be cumulatively required. Kühling (n 2) 683.
103 The CJEU did not have to make any precise conclusion in Schrems, as the essence of the 
right to private life was found to be violated. Schrems (n 35) paras 93 and 94.
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society” must be interpreted in this context as “strict necessity”’.104 The 
ECtHR explained:
A measure of secret surveillance can be found as being in compli-
ance with the Convention only if it is strictly necessary, as a general 
consideration, for the safeguarding the democratic institutions and, 
moreover, if it is strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for 
the obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation. 
Commensurately with the CJEU and the German CC, the ECtHR 
requires intense proportionality on data protection, in particular if the 
people concerned are not aware of surveillance. The Court does not allow 
this developing technology, with all its power or smartness, to override 
the law. Not everything that is possible is allowed.105 In the same way, 
general or public interests cannot serve as abstract justification for using 
any technology possible. 
4.4.1 Data retention is not excluded a priori as a legislative instrument 
Digital Rights Ireland was a rather scathing verdict on data retention. 
Although the German CC stated that state authorities are not allowed to 
retain all data possible without any reason, including the content and 
knowledge of internet pages used by individuals, data retention was 
deemed permitted under strict necessity requirements.106 Such opinions 
and the unanswered questions in Digital Rights Ireland in particular at 
the level of the Member States forced a second judgment. In Tele2 Sver-
ige in 2016, it became clear that data retention under the conditions of 
strict necessity was not deemed in itself a forbidden legal approach.107 
EU law, in particular article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, does not pre-
vent Member States from preventive legislative measures on data reten-
tion for the purpose of fighting serious crime, limited to what is strictly 
necessary. In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU did not mention the clear 
lawfulness of data retention. Instead, the Court intensively elaborated a 
dozen elements leading to disproportionality. After its judgment on data 
retention, the CJEU was raised as a guardian of data protection, a true 
constitutional or fundamental rights court.108 At least it was seen as es-
sential proof on the way towards a fully respected CFR and to the position 
of a functional fundamental rights court. Instead of delivering a scathing 
104 Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016) paras 73.
105 Kühling (n 2) 685.
106 BVerfG (n 31) para 183ff. 
107 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 109.
108 Kotzur (n 2) 592; Kühling (n 2); Kingreen (n 43) art 52 GRCh, 2985, para 71; Friederike 
Lange,  ̒Verschiebungen im europäischen Grundrechtssystem? ̓ 33 (2014) NVwZ  169, 173; 
Jürgen Schwarze,  ̒Die Abwägung von Zielen der europäischen Integration und mitglied-
staatlichen Interessen in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH ̓ 48 (2013) EuR  253. 
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verdict, the German CC from the beginning deemed data retention as a 
lawful legal instrument for security concerns. The way taken by the Ger-
man court was to link the strict requirements of justification to a legisla-
tive approach on data retention without obstructing the legislative path.
4.4.2 Widespread retention of data of all means of communication and all 
people without distinctions, limitations or exceptions
The CJEU brandishes the scathing criticism that ‘… the directive 
covers all subscribers and registered users. It therefore entails an inter-
ference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European 
population’,109 and further emphasises that it ‘… covers, in a generalised 
manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication as well 
as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception …’.110 
This seems to be a recurring theme through the case law of the CJEU on 
data protection. In its ASNEF case, the Court emphasises the need to 
consider the concerned rights linked to the processing of data: ‘… exclud-
ing, in a categorical and generalised manner, the possibility of processing 
certain categories of personal data, without allowing the opposing rights 
and interests at issue to be balanced against each other in a particular 
case’. A proportionate consideration of the rights concerned is needed in 
the case of processing data without the knowledge of people. If people do 
not know who has control of their data and what happens to personal 
data, this leads to a sense of constant surveillance of private life with the 
consequence of restriction, less freedom and curtailed actions.111 The Ger-
man CC broadly speaks of a deterrent or intimidation effect.112 Consider-
ing the importance of data protection as a paramount fundamental right, 
it is understandable to apply a stricter proportionality test than in other 
cases. The more data protection is restricted, the more strictly proportion-
ality has to be verified. Having the Snowden knowledge in mind, the CJEU 
demanded data to be retained on the territory of the EU.113 The German 
CC was not as demanding. The retention of data could have an effect on 
the use of means of electronic communication and, consequently, on its 
exercise by the users thereof. After an evaluation of the effects of interfer-
ence, the Court again explains its expectation of national legislation to 
conform to the CFR and the general principles of primary law: 
national legislation must, first, lay down clear and precise rules gov-
erning the scope and application of such a data retention measure 
109 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 56.
110 ibid, paras 57, 63; Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 51.
111 BVerfG (n 31) para 212.
112 Bäcker (n 1) 1267; Markus Oermann and Julia Staben,  ̒Mittelbare Grundrechtseingriffe 
durch Abschreckung? ̓ (2013) 52 Der Staat 630.
113 Bäcker (n 1) 1269.
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and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data 
has been retained have sufficient guarantees of the effective protec-
tion of their personal data against the risk of misuse. That legislation 
must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances and under which 
conditions a data retention measure may, as a preventive measure, 
be adopted, thereby ensuring that such a measure is limited to what 
is strictly necessary ….114  
In the light of the principle of proportionality, widespread retention 
of data is not acceptable, in particular due to the exceptional law prin-
ciple. Both the CJEU and the German CC doctrinally agree on the im-
portance of this principle. It would be a paradox to generally allow data 
processing and to make data protection the exception. According to the 
CJEU, exceptions have to be limited to what is strictly necessary,115 while 
the German CC declares that widespread data retention of all people and 
all means of communication are exceptions which should not serve as 
a model for surveillance. Surveillance or a police state, as illustrated in 
George Orwell’s 1984, is to be avoided, not enabled. Processing of data to 
protect against danger is only permitted if real indications exist for believ-
ing that a concrete danger to life, limb or freedom exists.116 In addition, 
the German CC requires that further surveillance measures have to be 
put on the surveillance balance sheet to avoid the state converting itself 
into a surveillance state.117 Such an idea allows quantitative evaluations, 
comparisons and assessments. The inaccuracies of such a balance sheet 
are not a hindering factor because it only serves as a verification test for 
the relations of the exceptional-law-principle. It must not be used for pre-
cise mathematical calculations. 
The CJEU deems interference with data protection through wide-
spread data retention to be extensive and particularly severe. The fact 
that data are retained and subsequently used without the subscriber or 
registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the 
persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of 
constant surveillance.118 Analogously, the German CC pronounced that 
the secrecy of interference strengthens and causes a sense of constant 
surveillance and diffuse danger.119 It is an interference of extraordinary 
weight and depth.120 Remarkably, the courts describe the seriousness of 
114 Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 109ff. 
115 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 52. 
116 BVerfG (n 31) para 230ff. 
117 ibid, para 218, 228f. 
118 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 37.
119 BVerfG (n 31) para 212, 241f; cf further decisions of the court on interference in Bäcker 
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interference by the feelings and subjective view of the people potentially 
concerned. Objective proof is not needed, and, in any case, it would ac-
tually be difficult to prove scientifically or empirically such a subjective 
view.121 Already the noticeable reluctance to exercise rights of freedom 
may be deemed as a limitation of fundamental rights.122 From the past, it 
is known that people behave differently in repressive systems. From the 
point of view of primary law, new doctrinal paths may appear. If the sub-
jective view on fundamental rights has any influence, this may change 
the examination of interference with fundamental rights and at the same 
time increase the requirements of justification. Clearly, both courts em-
phasise that the level of strict necessity or proportionality is stricter in 
cases where more paramount rights such as data protection are con-
cerned. For state authorities, this means that the legal basis used for 
interference has to be implemented or applied more thoroughly. Actions 
have to be better justified, explained and prepared.
4.4.3 Substantive conditions and objective criteria that are clear and precise 
Both courts demand more precise, clear conditions and criteria to 
be set by legislation on data retention. But the clarity and intensity of 
the specifications of legislation differ between the courts and the differ-
ent judgments. Although only two years lie between the CJEU judgments 
in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige, an extended tonality is given 
by the Court. The CJEU states in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data 
Retention Directive fails to lay down any objective criteria by which to de-
termine the limits of access to data and their subsequent use.123 Accord-
ing to the Court, the directive also fails to lay down objective criteria by 
which the number of persons authorised to access and subsequently use 
data is limited to what is strictly necessary.124 Again, the CJEU in Digi-
tal Rights Ireland criticises the legislator without stipulating minimum 
requirements. In contrast, the German CC demands the German legisla-
tor to define serious crimes in a catalogue. Accordingly, the processing 
of data is to be allowed only in cases of concrete danger to life, limb or 
freedom.125 In its Tele2 Sverige decision in 2016, the CJEU describes the 
need for substantive conditions and objective criteria on justification in 
a more intense tonality.126 Accordingly, such conditions may vary with 
reference to the nature of the measures in question. The Court speaks 
121 Kühling (n 2); Bäcker (n 1) 1267.
122 Oermann and Staben (n 112) 630. 
123 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 60.
124 ibid, para 62. 
125 BVerfG (n 31) para 230ff.
126 Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 110; for rather strong comments on the advance-
ment in Tele 2 Sverige in contrast to Digital Rights Ireland, see Alexander Roßnagel, 
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not only of serious crime, but of measures for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution. In particular, such conditions 
should in practice describe the extent of such measures with the public 
affected. Hence, national legislation must be based on objective evidence 
to justify a link between data retention and fighting serious crime.127 Data 
retention has to contribute to this objective. The Court allows access to 
data only with regard to individuals suspected of planning, committing 
or having committed a serious crime or of being implicated one way or 
another.128 In this context, the CJEU expressly refers to the decision of 
the ECtHR in Zakharov v Russia.129 
The question of serious crime essentially has to be dealt under the 
legitimate objective. According to the CJEU and the German CC, interfer-
ence with data protection has to be based on such a legal basis. Instead 
of widespread retention of data, concrete facts of suspicion may serve 
as a proportionate approach to data protection. What a serious crime is 
and what degree of suspicion is needed are traditional questions of crimi-
nal law. In German legislation, the law of data retention is implemented 
through the Telecommunications Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
This shows that the field of data protection is additionally determined by 
correlating legal fields. Complex thinking is needed to cope with increas-
ing globalisation in all essential areas of law, technology and the econo-
my. This also apparently applies to the principle of proportionality.130 All 
these developments require more holistic, hermeneutic approaches from 
a universal scholarly perspective than fragmented solutions. 
It seems that the CJEU is rather cautious concerning other state 
powers in Digital Rights Ireland. Perhaps this is a result of the criticism 
on its innovative character and the national tendencies within the Mem-
ber States.131 Digital Rights Ireland left several questions unanswered, 
creating doubts on the application of EU and national legislation on data 
retention.132 The German CC deemed that a new law on data retention 
was justified.133 This was a clear message to the German legislator. At the 
same time, the German CC requires strict limits, minimum requirements 
and guarantees in particular on organisational and technical means. For 
its detailed elaborations and governance, the court was criticised on the 
127 Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 111.
128 ibid, para 119. 
129 ibid. 
130 Saurer (n 55) 9; Benedikt Schneiders, Die Grundrechte der EU und die EMRK (Nomos 
2010) 203.
131 Schwarze (n 108) 254. For further explanations of fundamental rights, see Werner 
Schroeder,  ̒Neues zur Grundrechtskontrolle in der Europäischen Union ̓ (2011) 22 EuZW 
462, 466.
132 Bäcker (n 1) 1265; Kühling (n 2) 683.
133 BVerfG (n 31) para 183ff. 
156 Zlatan Meškić and Darko Samardžić: The Strict Necessity Test on Data Protection by the CJEU
grounds of separation of powers.134 From a fundamental rights perspec-
tive, the demand for guarantees is a great stride forward in advancing the 
functions of fundamental rights within primary law. 
Digital Rights Ireland may be seen as respectful proceedings of the 
Court towards the legislator which bases its power very much on demo-
cratic legitimation and governmental expertise. The critical, but cautious, 
judgment of the Court is an expression of respect or judicial self-restraint. 
The question of Rechtsfortbildung (development of law by judicial deci-
sions) v Kontrolldichte (density of judicial scrutiny) reflects the dialec-
tic of different general principles of law, mainly democratic legitimation, 
separation of powers and rule of law.135 The case law on strict necessity 
unavoidably leads to an increased Kontrolldichte of the court over legis-
lation.136 This is understandable and necessary in respect of the require-
ments of coherence by positive law such as article 52(3) CFR. The CJEU 
can hardly afford to fall below the protection level of data protection rec-
ognised by the ECtHR and its Member States.137 Moreover, there is a 
question if the CJEU is obliged to increase the level of protection in the 
spirit of article 52 III 2 CFR after its own clarifications on the paramount 
importance of data protection. As far as the CJEU stipulates minimum or 
clear requirements, the Court narrows the freedom of the legislator, and 
provides governance or direction. But this is a natural dialectic between 
state powers. In full awareness of the need to protect fundamental rights 
and ensure an appropriate protection level in the spirit of the rule of law, 
the CJEU states that the margin of the legislator is limited or reduced by 
the rights of data protection together with the general principles of law 
such as proportionality and legal certainty.138 This is also remarkable, 
because the CJEU usually provides the legislator with a broad margin of 
appreciation. 
With its clarity in Tele2 Sverige, the CJEU provokes a debate on the 
aforementioned general principles of law such as the separation or bal-
ance of powers. But this does not mean that the Court did anything es-
sentially wrong. Overall, the statements are not really new in comparison 
to Digital Rights Ireland, but in Tele2 Sverige the Court answers differ-
134 Bäcker (n 1) 1273. 
135 Weiß (n 50) 290; Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister  ̒Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßig-
keit ̓ (2014) 54 JuS 193; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University 
Press  2006) 164; Ladenburger and Krämer (n 46)  art 52 GRCh, 800, para 55; Jarass (n 52) 
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Niels Lutzhöft,  ̒Grundrechte-Charta und Grundrechts-Checkliste – eine dogmatische Selb-
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ent open questions in a clearer tone.139 In legal literature, Tele 2 Sverige 
is seen more as a decision in terms of legal policy. The Court provided 
clearer governance regarding a political and legal discourse that has now 
been unfurling for over a decade.140 
4.4.4 Technical and organisational measures of protection and security 
The CJEU demands the Member States to adopt appropriate tech-
nical and organisational measures against accidental or unlawful de-
struction, accidental loss or alteration of data.141 Irrespective of the con-
tent itself, communication data may allow conclusions on the private 
lives of the people concerned.142 The ECtHR, in its decisions such as 
Leanders and Aman, had already required appropriate data protection 
through governance, control or conformity.143 For instance, the legislator 
may specify conditions of access, storage or destruction. Technical and 
procedural causality are directly linked to the content of data enabling 
access or knowledge. Technical procedures may enable restrictions and 
conclusions on private lives. It would be unjustifiable to formally sepa-
rate data content from data conditions and to deem the conditions as 
unimportant procedural issues. The German CC is stricter by claiming 
that external circumstances may allow conclusions on behaviour and 
content of communication.144 To obtain insights into essential parts of 
privacy or to be able to draw a picture of personality touches on data 
protection.145 What else should be the sense of profiling or other com-
munication analysis? The legislation in question must lay down clear 
and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in 
question and impose minimum safeguards so that the persons whose 
data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect 
their personal data against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful 
access and use of that data.146 The need for such safeguards is deemed 
all the greater where personal data are subjected to automatic processing 
and where there is a significant risk of unlawful access to those data.147 
Overall, the Court demands that the protection and security of the data 
in question be governed in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure 
their full integrity and confidentiality.148 Thereby the Court clarifies that 
139 Roßnagel (n 126) 697. 
140 Roßnagel (n 26) 533.
141 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 40.
142 BVerfG (n 31) para 211.
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single security rules may not be sufficient. The legislator has to ensure 
the principles of integrity and confidentiality. This is more expressed as 
a guarantee, an obligation to ensure a certain level of protection preven-
tively and effectively, eg by minimum standards, as a technical or organi-
sational mechanism. This understanding has already been established 
by the ECtHR in the area of data protection.149 
In 2008 the German CC made a decision on online searches, the 
Online Durchsuchungen case. To complete data protection through fun-
damental rights, the German court established the right to the confiden-
tiality and integrity of IT systems.150 The court deems data security as a 
framework requirement of data protection. Technical and organisational 
means as guarantees of a high protection and security level may not de-
pend on economic considerations.151 The court believes that data protec-
tion may be restricted not only content-wise, but also through technical, 
organisational means. In the digitalised era, infrastructure, devices or 
other media are gates to data. Hence, the way to data requires comple-
mentary protection and guarantees to the content of data itself.
By referring to guarantees, both courts touch on the essentials of 
fundamental rights functions.152 The functions and scope of such rights 
in a contemporary society are no longer seen as narrowed rights of in-
dividuals in relation to physical breaches through state authorities. On 
the other hand, fundamental rights are not accepted as competences to 
change all democratic, social or economic behaviour, or as legitimation 
or rules for redistribution or equality. Thus, the question is to what extent 
state authorities have to protect fundamental rights functionally, preven-
tively or effectively. Traditionally, fundamental rights serve as status nega-
tivus rights.153 But it would be insufficient to protect data rights only from 
direct, serious attacks. Data protection may more effectively be seen from 
its effects, not from predefined classifications such as physical ones or 
otherwise, private ones or otherwise.154 Fundamental rights demand state 
powers to be active, to ensure the functionality of fundamental rights, for 
149 Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Die Bedeutung der EMRK für den deutschen und den un-
ionalen Grundrechtsschutz‘ (2014) 36 JA 916, 917. 
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instance through procedures or guarantees. In other words, this dimen-
sion of fundamental rights may be described by positive obligations.155 In 
the area of data protection, organisational and technical means of protec-
tion and security are needed to ensure data security. This includes, for 
example, the obligations of information, disclosure or deletion.156 Such 
knowledge is a precondition to effectively exercise fundamental rights, in-
cluding defence rights. In this sense, both courts speak of sufficient guar-
antees to protect fundamental rights effectively.157 Thereby, the courts set 
higher and higher limits of data protection. In the light of a general right 
of privacy, every individual has to be free and self-determined in deci-
sions about the release and processing of personal data.158 The ECtHR 
derives obligations of protection and guarantee on data protection (Ger-
man: Schutz- und Gewährleistungspflichten).159
4.4.5 Retention periods 
It is incomprehensible that data may be retained for a period of at 
least six months without any distinction being made between categories 
of data on the basis of their possible usefulness for the purposes of the 
objective pursued or according to the persons concerned.160 Furthermore, 
the period is set at between a minimum of six months and a maximum 
of twenty-four months, but it is not stated that the determination of the 
period of retention must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure 
that it is limited to what is strictly necessary.161 The AG here correctly 
stipulates that the retention period should also be assessed from the per-
spective of a regular necessity test, rather than reasonableness.162 Name-
ly, the question is not whether, from the point of view of the prevention 
of serious criminal activities, a longer retention and availability period is 
preferable to a shorter period, but whether, in the context of an examina-
tion of its proportionality, there is a specific need for it.163 The German CC 
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is here more precise because the court precisely refers to a period of six 
months, not allowing a broader timeframe.164 Expressly, the court states: 
Actually, a retention period of six months is, due to the extent and 
significance of the retained data, very long and at the absolute limit 
of what is justifiable according to proportionality. But after the re-
tention period each individual concerned can rely on the destruction 
of data and that such data are not reconstructable for anybody, ex-
cept of such data already accessed due to serious reasons. 
The German court is rather definite in its requirements and imposes 
these obligations on state authorities without the need for individuals to 
provide reasoned requests. There is no room for extensions of retention 
time, and data have to be irreversibly destroyed. 
4.4.6 Prior court or administrative review of access to data 
The CJEU makes criticism that access by competent national au-
thorities to data retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried 
out by a court or by an independent administrative body.165 It is remark-
able that the Court deems an administrative body in the sense of article 
8(3) CFR equivalent to a prior review carried out by a court. Of course, 
article 8(3) CFR itself offers such a perspective by its wording. But, if data 
protection is deemed a paramount right, it is hardly enough to allow the 
processing of data by the approval of an administrative authority. In such 
a case, one state authority would provide an approval to another state 
authority. This understanding does not reflect the idea of the principle 
of separation of powers. According to the wording of article 8(3) CFR, an 
independent authority is needed. But a view into legal literature shows 
that this wording is interpreted in the light of the paramount importance 
of data protection.166 The requirements are directed more to a totally in-
dependent authority that is institutionally, functionally and materially 
independent.167 The CJEU itself deemed it necessary to emphasise in 
Commission v Austria in 2012: 
The Court has already held in its judgment in Commission v Ger-
many, paragraph 30, that the words ‘with complete independence’ in 
the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 must be 
interpreted as meaning that the supervisory authorities for the pro-
tection of personal data must enjoy an independence which allows 
them to perform their duties free from external influence. The Court 
also stated in that judgment that those authorities must remain free 
164 BVerfG (n 31) para 205, 208ff. 
165 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 62.
166 Raschauer and Riesz (n 7) art 8 GRC, 115, para 25.
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from any external influence, direct or indirect, which is liable to have 
an effect on their decisions …’.168 
Only such an understanding supports the idea of such an authority 
as a guardian of fundamental rights.
The German CC demands a court decision. Administrative bodies are 
not considered at all. The ECtHR supports this requirement of a judicial 
review which cannot be substituted through an administrative decision: 
the Court notes the absence of prior judicial authorisation for inter-
ceptions … This safeguard would serve to limit the law-enforcement 
authorities’ discretion in interpreting the broad terms of ‘persons 
concerned identified ... as a range of persons’ by following an estab-
lished judicial interpretation of the terms or an established practice 
to verify whether sufficient reasons for intercepting a specific indi-
vidual’s communications exist in each case … A central issue com-
mon to both the stage of authorisation of surveillance measures and 
the one of their application is the absence of judicial supervision. 
The measures are authorised by the Minister in charge of justice 
upon a proposal from the executives of the relevant security services 
…. For the Court, this supervision, eminently political … but carried 
out by the Minister of Justice who appears to be formally independ-
ent of both the TEK and of the Minister of Home Affairs – is inher-
ently incapable of ensuring the requisite assessment of strict neces-
sity with regard to the aims and the means at stake. In particular, 
although the security services are required, in their applications to 
the Minister for warrants, to outline the necessity as such of secret 
information gathering, this procedure does not guarantee that an 
assessment of strict necessity is carried out …169  
4.4.7 Economic interests as an influencing factor of protection and security 
The German CC clearly states that the protection and security 
level to be granted must be independent of economic considerations.170 
Independence indicates that any interpretation has to be free of economic 
reasons. Hence, safety requirements cannot easily be adapted to increasing 
costs or market challenges. This understanding is not clearly expressed by 
the CJEU. The Court criticises that the Data Retention Directive does not 
ensure that a particularly high level of protection and security is applied 
by those providers by means of technical and organisational measures, 
but permits those providers in particular to have regard to economic 
168 Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2012:631, para 41.
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considerations when determining the level of security which they apply, 
as regards the costs of implementing security measures.171
On the other hand, it is remarkable to see how precise and demand-
ing the German CC is towards legislation. With respect to the funda-
mental rights of the service providers obliged by the legislator on data 
retention, the German CC requires a consideration of the costs and ef-
forts of providers caused by data retention. Indeed, the German legisla-
tor already reacted in its new legislation on data retention in 2015. For 
specific providers, compensation of damages is foreseen. However, the 
regulation is questionable with regard to the preconditions of compensa-
tion and equal treatment. 
4.5 Consequences for the methodology and future application of 
strict necessity 
The intense discussion on proportionality confirms the increasing 
meaning of, and the need to cope with and apply, this principle.172 Article 
52(1) CFR clearly demands an examination of proportionality as the back-
bone of justification of fundamental rights. Perhaps the CFR was under-
estimated, but its effects are enormous and the seriousness of the CJEU 
confirms its responsibilities concerning fundamental rights.173 It is not 
by chance that in the meanwhile there has been a globalisation of the 
principle of proportionality through constitutionalisation, codification and 
jurisdiction.174 This does not mean that only one logic or one means of in-
terpretation or application applies. Although we may see the international 
reception of proportionality, this does not mean that a universal legal doc-
trine has been established.175 Codification and jurisdiction do not auto-
matically accept or design one universal doctrine. Different views exist on 
how this principle should be structured and applied. As long as the main 
idea is respected, cultural or other specific requirements of the respective 
legal system may demand its own interpretation or application.176 Appar-
ently, proportionality is a rather challenging general principle of law.177 
Without doubt, proportionality is supported by the case law of 
the CJEU. The Court clearly states that it is necessary to verify the 
171 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 67.
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proportionality of interference to data protection and points out 
that according to the settled case law of the Court, the principle of 
proportionality requires that EU actions are appropriate for attaining 
the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do 
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve those objectives.178 Specifically for data protection, the Court 
refers to the recitals of Directive 2002/58 pointing out that measures 
of this kind must be strictly proportionate to the intended purpose.179 
In Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige we can identify a structure or 
power of proportionality as required in article 52(1) CFR.180 But the way 
the Court applies proportionality is not fully comprehensible, logical and 
consistent.181 We have shown that the strict necessity of the CJEU in the 
two analysed judgments is equivalent to a reasonableness test concerning 
elements of justification. Comprehensibly, the Court starts to examine 
the essence of data protection and the legitimate objective. But the Court 
skipped the examination of the elements of appropriateness in Tele2 
Sverige and necessity in both judgments. Instead, the next element of 
strict necessity summarises different elements of proportionality under 
one umbrella. This is a method the CJEU developed for strict necessity 
even before the Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige judgments and 
seems to have become established practice for this test.182 Proportionality 
in a strictly technical sense expresses the proportion of the single 
elements of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality in the narrow 
sense or reasonableness with regard to the legitimate objective.183 It is 
clearly a concept of several steps, layers or dimensions, and not free, 
widespread balancing. The CJEU itself distinguishes between necessity 
and reasonableness. Necessity chronologically, systematically and 
teleologically is the first of the two to be examined. Even if the next 
step is named differently, it is the next and last step of proportionality. 
There is no need to mix up these elements. It leads to the danger of 
not examining every single step of the proportionality test to the proper 
extent, leaving uncertainty for future legislative activities.184 As shown, 
necessity is a more scientific, empirical test without the need to be 
burdened with elements of balancing or normative assessment. There is 
178 Digital Rights Ireland (n 34) para 45f; Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 96.
179 Tele2 Sverige AB (n 29) para 95.
180 Kingreen (n 43) Art 52 GRCh, 2985, para 71. 
181 Saurer (n 55) 9; O Koch, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung 
des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Duncker & Humblot 2003) 494ff.
182 See already in the CJEU judgment in Volker and Schecke (n 13); J Kühling and M Klar 
(2010) Transparenz vs Datenschutz – erste Gehversuche des EuGH bei der Anwendung der 
Grundrechtecharta (2011) 33 Jura 771, 775.
183 Reimer (n 174) 41.
184 Kühling and Klar (n 181) 775.
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no need to query legal discipline and confidence through methodological 
arbitrariness.185
Reasonableness or proportionality in the narrow sense is not free of 
balancing rights.186 Finally, proportionality in the case law of the CJEU 
on data protection seems to be very much a question of fair balance 
with regard to the understanding of the ECtHR.187 In its case Volker and 
Schecke, the Court expresses the closer link of balance to proportional-
ity by speaking of a proper balance.188 The balancing character of rea-
sonableness may be more anchored in the spirit of article 52(1) CFR by 
the logic of proportionality. Instead of pure balancing, the German CC is 
very much focused on the content of each single right, its proportion to-
wards the legitimate objective and the correlations among the concerned 
rights.189 Additionally, proportionality consists of a logic in sequences. 
First, rights may be examined generally, and, second, each individual 
case treated individually.190 This may lead to differing results. Ultimately, 
balancing is only a consequence of legal reasoning, not a simple weigh-
ing and defining of the content, limits or significance of fundamental 
rights.191 Often, balancing is used to criticise proportionality, while pro-
portionality is often used as a knockout argument to blur clarity and 
precision.192 But the logic followed here shows that, before balancing, the 
different elements of proportionality serve to achieve a more neutral, logi-
cal, scientific and legal view on justification, even if balancing may finally 
be needed. The formal structure and logic has to be distinguished from 
the external factors with their impact on the different rights concerned.193 
185 Thomas von Danwitz,  ̒Der Einfluss des nationalen Rechts und der Rechtsprechung der 
Gerichte der Mitgliedsataaten auf die Auslegung des Gemeinschaftsrechts ̓ (2008) 7 ZESAR 
57, 61.
186 Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (20th 
edn, CF Müller 1995) 317; Klatt and Moritz (n 133) 194; Werner Schroeder, Das Gemein-
schaftsrechtsystem (Mohr Siebeck 2002) 281; Reimer (n 174) 35.
187 Case C-275/06 Promusiciae ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, para 68; Joined Cases C-468/10 and 
C-469/10 ASNEF ECLI:EU:C:2011:777 paras 43, 47f; Jarass (n 52) art 52 GRCh 500, para 
33, 503, para 41, 510, para 59ff.
188 Volker und Schecke (n 13) paras 77, 86.
189 BVerfG (n 31) para 320.
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nismäßigkeitsprüfung ̓ (2015) 55 JuS 116.
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Überwachung zur Gefahrenabwehr ̓ (2015) 34 NVwZ 2015 1335, 1336; Reimer (n 174) 27, 
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The doctrine of proportionality serves as a framework and limitation 
of free balancing of opinions and interests. It is crucial that reasonable-
ness fully respects the different general principles of law and follows the 
recognised legal methodology. Symbolically, Sweet and Mathews speak of 
proportionality balancing.194 Balancing by people can hardly be assessed 
as purely objective. People, including judges, are by nature subjective. 
But this does not mean to support personal opinions, decisionism or 
conceptual jurisprudence.195 Different elements have to be considered on 
the basis of general principles of law and recognised legal methodology. 
For example, the principle of proportionality is framed and strengthened 
by the principle of legal certainty.196 Repeatedly, the CJEU requires clear, 
precisely defined regulations. Thereby, the Court within strict necessity 
refers to the principles of legal certainty.197 Balancing is framed by posi-
tive law, rights and general principles. It cannot be determined by any 
interest. Factual and legal arguments have first to be hermeneutical eval-
uated according to positive law and the factual circumstances.198 Thus, 
elements of necessity have to be examined in a state-of-the-art approach 
without normative assessment. In this sense of legal technique, balanc-
ing is primary not a question of objectivity, but of legal assessment.  
5 Reaction of the German legislator: conformity to proportionality 
and data protection in EU law? 
In light of the judgments on data retention, it is worth seeing the new 
legislation on data retention by the German legislator in 2015.199 Follow-
ing the German CC, the legislator foresaw rather high, detailed justifica-
tion needs for data retention in this new law.  
The state-of-the-art approach with regard to organisational and 
technical means is a recurring theme through the new legislation, in par-
ticular expressed in § 113 d of the Telecommunications Act. Pursuant 
to § 113 b VIII of the Telecommunications Act, providers are obliged to 
destroy data irreversibly as soon as possible after the end of the data re-
tention period, at the latest within one week. The destruction has to be 
done according to the state of the art of the technology, as indicated in § 
194 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ̒Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitution-
alism ̓ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72.
195 Reimer (n 174) 34.
196 cf comments on legal certainty on the grounds of Art 52(1) CFR, Jarass (n 52) art 52 
GRCh 498, para 27; Florian Becker,  ̒Grundrechtliche Grenzen staatlicher Überwachung 
zur Gefahrenabwehr ̓ (2015) 34 NVwZ 2015 1335, 1336.
197 Becker (n 195) 1335, 1336.
198 Reimer (n 174) 48.
199 ̒Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrs-
daten ̓ BGBl I 2015, 2218; Roßnagel (n 126) 697f; Roßnagel (n 26) 534.
166 Zlatan Meškić and Darko Samardžić: The Strict Necessity Test on Data Protection by the CJEU
113 f. Further, § 113 e I of the Telecommunications Act demands meet-
ing minutes for each destruction. According to § 113 d-g of the Telecom-
munications Act, organisational and technical means have to be state 
of the art to guarantee data security and protection. Specific encryption 
methods have to be used, access has to be granted only by a four-eyes 
principle and data have to be stored in the intranet separately from data 
processing systems. Minutes have to record each access to or processing 
of data (§ 113 e).
Other essential amendments were made in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure to enable the processing of data for prosecutions. This shows that 
the German legislator thinks in two directions: the preventive, urgent 
averting of danger, and repressive prosecution.
Two regulations of the new German law hardly conform to the judg-
ment in Digital Rights Ireland. 
Firstly, the legislator limited the privilege of professional secrecy only 
to people belonging to the scope of § 99 II of the Telecommunications Act 
instead of protecting all professional bearers of secrets.200 This scope only 
captures activities in the area of the church or social professions. But the 
German CC only referred to § 99 II of the Telecommunications Act as an 
example.201 Moreover, the court pronounces that professional secrecy in 
this context has to be deemed as an expression of the principle of pro-
portionality. Now, other people, such as lawyers or doctors, obtain pro-
tection of professional secrecy when prosecution authorities start with 
the enforcement of a law. This is already clarified by § 53 I of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. Here the CJEU was much more protective. The 
Court required a privilege for all professional bearers of secrets.  
Secondly, the main criticism refers to the general permission on data 
retention. Only subsequent use of data follows specific, strict require-
ments. But it is worrying that the German legislator takes the judgment 
of the German CC literally and did not align its legislation in 2015 with 
the main message given by the CJEU on data retention in Digital Rights 
Ireland in 2014. The new German law allows the retention of traffic data 
for ten weeks without any reason, and location data from mobile com-
munication for four weeks. In such a general, widespread manner, data 
retention does not conform to the spirit of Digital Rights Ireland.202 Such 
a widespread approach is not really what is strictly necessary.203 Even 
200 Julia Kleen and Andreas Riegler,  ̒Big Brother lässt grüßen – Vorratsdatenspeicherung 
die Zweite! ̓ (2017) 14 Ad Legendum, 59, 65; Nachbaur (n 40) 216; Roßnagel (n 126) 698; 
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the German CC indicated that the widespread, preventive retention of all 
data cannot be the goal of legislation.204 The restriction of data protection 
must remain an exception. 
6 Conclusion
Direct access to the content of communication compromises the es-
sence of the right to private life, as fundamentally concluded by the CJEU 
in Schrems. In addition, permitted access needs to be on a generalised 
basis. Indirect knowledge of the communication content, by the retention 
of other communication data that allow very precise conclusions on the 
private life of the people concerned, does not compromise the essence of 
the right to private life. This is the conclusion drawn from Digital Rights 
Ireland and Tele2 Sverige.  
The strict necessity test applies to all elements of the proportionality 
test: the legitimate objective, appropriateness, necessity and reasonable-
ness. The importance of the right to data protection requires that all of 
these elements are examined more strictly. Strict necessity is not just 
a stricter necessity test. In Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige the 
CJEU did not examine necessity at all. Although ‘quick freeze’ and ‘quick 
freeze plus’ were worth examining as being possibly less onerous, the 
CJEU skipped the test. This was an opportunity missed, considering that 
the CJEU in the Volker and Schecke judgments applied ‘strict necessity’ 
in the form of stricter necessity. It lowered the standard for the necessity 
test by not requiring the alternative means to be equally effective, but 
just a ‘still effective contribution’. Such a lower standard makes it much 
harder for the legislator to pass the necessity test for data retention. 
Strict necessity further requires the legitimate objective to be restricted to 
preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences, and not just 
any serious crime. 
The case law on strict necessity unavoidably leads to increased Kon-
trolldichte of the Court over legislation. The critical, but still cautious, 
judgments of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige are 
an expression of judicial self-restraint. The German CC, with different 
democratic legitimation, goes further. The German legislator, with its 
new legislation on data retention in 2015, still gets it wrong. By allowing 
data retention in a general manner, it goes against the spirit of the Digital 
Rights Ireland judgment. 
Each element of proportionality has to be seen individually with-
in a logical structure, not as a mass under an umbrella. Although the 
CJEU supports the idea of proportionality following positive law in article 
204 BVerfG (n 31) para 218.
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52(1) CFR, the Court unnecessarily raises questions through its general 
approach on proportionality. It seems that if one or more elements are 
disproportionate, then this is sufficient. But then the Court evokes con-
fusion on legal discipline and confidence. The power of proportionality 
lies in its logic and sequences. Proportionality may firstly be approached 
generally, looking at the significance and weight of each element, and, 
secondly, at the individual case where the significance and weight may 
change. In the end, we have the link of doctrinal and case law approach-
es. Pure or summarised balancing is not the intended purpose.205 The 
abstract testing of rights should be independent and followed by a test 
in each individual case. Rights may have another weight or intensity in 
a specific case. Instead of simple balancing, the necessity test requires 
a state-of-the-art approach based on the best possible knowledge and 
empiricism to ensure effectiveness. This is not a question of normative 
assessment, but of fair or proportional balancing in the spirit of practi-
cal concordance. Reasonableness in the spirit of practical concordance 
requires the maximum preservation of rights in the light of the principle 
of coherence. Instead of summarised balancing, it should be clear which 
elements of proportionality cause disproportionality or invalidity, and to 
what extent. This is the basis of legal security and of the legal system as 
a whole. 
205 Reimer (n 81) 36.
